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INTRODUCTION
The final success of any business is measured in its profit-
ability, and it is the job of the manager to attempt to maximize that
profitability. Business men have come to realize that in many cases
greater profits can be obtained by selling in foreign countries. Some
reasons for this may be decreased competition, demand being in the
primary or secondary stage for most products, and the costs of factors
of production being less in some areas. All of these factors tend to
Increase the margin on products sold. In some cases, managers are able
to produce out of unused capacity in plants in the United States thus
spreading their overhead without incurring large capital expenditures.
But in others, managers have decided to build or purchase plants in
the countries in which they wish to sell. The reason for this might
be that the costs of production and selling would be less in these
countries. On the other hand, and this factor will become more im-
portant in the future, the government of that country may have forced
the manager to produce in that country in order to sell there. No mat-
ter what the reason, more and more managers will find it necessary to
decide whether or not to produce in a foreign country.
This paper will look at the three most important factors
affecting foreign investment in Brazil, particularly American invest-
ment, and the role that labor-management problems have played in each.
The factors affecting foreign investment in Brazil and other Latin
2American countries, in the order of their present importance, are
inflation, communism, and for the United States, anti-Yankee feeling
and legislation. Communism and ant i -Yankee feeling aren't so im-
portant in Brazil now as they were before the last revolution and the
election of President Blanco. But revolutions won't solve the problem
of communism; they can only reduce its present importance.
This paper will show that inflation was not a preventive factor
in the industralization of Brazil because of the weakness of the labor
movement in that country. It will also point out that the communist
inroads in the labor movement in Brazil have come about because of weak
management and weak labor. Finally, the paper will show that the in-
creased strength in the labor movement in Brazil has cut off growth
through the use of forced savings brought about by the inflationary
process.
Brazil was chosen as the country for study in this paper because
it may best point up the problems faced by foreign investors in deciding
whether or not to invest capital in Latin America. A word of warning
is in order here. One cannot directly generalize from the facts pre-
sented in this paper to other Latin American countries. Although the
overall problems may be similar, the different social conditions,
economic conditions, and political conditions will make the solutions
different for each country. The factors influencing foreign investment
must be analyzed within the social, economic, and political complex of
each country. Nevertheless, there are many similarities in the problems
faced by the Latin American countries, and Brazil seems to possess them
all. Also, Brazil is the richest country in Latin America in terms of
3land and natural resources and for this reason should, in the long-run,
be the location for the greatest amount of foreign investment: in Latin
America.
First, the paper will look at inflation; its real role in the
Brazilian economy, and the part played by labor in this role. Next, it
will look at each part of the labor-management structure to see how it
works, why it works, and the role played by communism in that structure.
Last, it will examine the communists themselves and see what, if anything,
can be done about halting their advance in the labor movement in Brazil.
INFLATION
The Effects of Inflation
There has been a great deal written about the effects of in-
flation on a developing economy, but more important than the effects
are the reasons for inflation in a developing economy. By understanding
the reasons for inflation in Brazil, the role labor has played in the
growth of the economic sector of Brazil can be better understood. Mr.
Gottfried Haberler summed up the reasons for inflation as follows:
Inflation is a consequence of at least three policy errors,
which produce their results in developed and underdeveloped
countries alike. First is the overexpansion of governmental
apparatus, vast bureaucracies and expensive armies which are
wasteful and which are unsupportable by the poorer countries.
Second are the massive wage increases which are directly
ordered by governments or enforced by government -coddled
trade unions. Argentine, Chile and Brazil may be cited here.
The third, perhaps most widespread cause of inflation, is
the speed with which development is pushed. Impatience to
get ahead, or to catch up, is met by the advice of many econ-
omists that capital investment is the necessary and sufficient
condition for a rapid rise in output and income. So expendi-
ture on capital investment is pushed ahead of the limited sup-
ply of capital from saving and imports, the rest of the economy
is distorted, and inflation is the consequence- -not develop-
ment.!
Mr. Haberler went on to explain the disastrous effects of in-
flation and their impact on development. First, he stated that inflation
produces social injustice for relatively fixed- income classes, such as
Gottfried Haberler, '"The Case for Minimum Intervention,"
Foreign Aid Reexamined (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), p. 146.
teacher 8, government officials, bondholders, other creditors, and
pensioners. Secular inflation discourages thrift and makes the
development of a capital market well-nigh impossible. It drives
what savings there are abroad, impedes capital imports, and mis-
directs the remaining capital available. Open inflation produces
excessive investment in inventories. Special problems are created
by the existence of controlled and uncontrolled prices in a single
economy. Public utility rates, as an example, may be held down by
government intervention below the point which allows maintenance and
replacement. Last, all efforts to repress inflation lead to increasing
interventions, controls, and misdirected expansion of government. Thus
the cure produces further inflation, bigger government, less develop-
ment. 2
Labor's Role in Inflation
How does this apply to Brazil and what has been the effect of
inflation on growth, appropriation of resources, and so on? Interest-
ingly enough, there are at least two writers, Werner Baer and Isaac
Kerstenetzky, who said that inflation has had little effect on the
appropriation of resources and has aided in capital accumulation by
forced savings. It has been Kerstenetzky' s theory that underdeveloped
countries could develop faster through deficit government spending
which would be paid for by forced savings in the private sector of
the economy. Baer in his book, Industrialization and Economic
2
Ibid., pp. 146-147.
6Development
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proved that this was the case in Brazil in the early 1950's.
Much can he learned about inflation in Brazil from this study and the
results will, no doubt, be applied to conditions in other underdeveloped
countries. The appendix at the end of the paper is intended to show this
relationship. Much of the importance of the rest of this paper is de-
rived from the conclusions reached by Baer.
Baer was able to show that inflation in Brazil in the 1950's
did not impede the growth of the economy. It may have actually pro-
vided some benefit by forcing the private sector to save and thus
help pay for the deficit spending of the government. He was also able
to show that this was done without a significant misappropriation of
resources. (See appendix) If inflation did not impede the growth
of the economy of Brazil and has not led to a huge misallocation of
resources, why is inflation the most important factor today in deter-
mining foreign investment: From the study in the appendix, it is
clear that the redistributive function of the Brazilian inflation
was able to work itself out only because the wage earnings sector was
not strong enough to insure the constancy of its share in the national
product of the country. This is shown by the lag in minimum wages in
the 1950's behind general price increases. Employers in Brazil have
tried to pay employees at the minimum wage rate whenever possible. The
weakness of the labor sector, shown in the fact that they weren't able
to increase wages as fast as prices, was partially due to the stern
control the government has had over the labor movement. More will be
said about this later in the paper.
7Labor's Role Today
The increased power of the labor market since 1961 would tend
to show that growth through the inflationary process will not repeat
itself in the sixties. Baer stated this as follows:
One could also venture the hypothesis that in a newly indus-
trializing country, with a large reservoir of rural labor, there
exists greater possibility of inflationary redistribution. It
takes new arrivals from rural areas some time to become relatively
sophisticated in the ways of a purely monetary economy and get
wise to the significance of general price increases which are
larger than wage increases they obtain. However, the much more
frequent readjustments of the minimum wage in the period since
1961, the more frequent strikes, and the greater independence
of the labor movement from governmental control would seem to
indicate that events of the fifties might not be able to repeat
themselves.
3
This was, as it turned out, the case in Brazil. Mr. William Withers
has described how the movement of wages with prices forced up costs
for the businessman.
If wages had been pushed up faster than prices, as in Argentina,
inflation would have had retarding effects on Brazilian businesses.
After 1961, however, the cost of labor began to rise, and businesses
suffered seriously from the general disruption caused by the con-
tinuation of the inflationary spiral.^
All of this happened under the Goulart regime. Goulart became
president after the sudden resignation of Janio Quadros in 1960.
Mr. Goulart was the head of the labor party and a leftward leaning
socialist. This was how Mr. Withers described the presidency of
Goulart.
Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development: in
Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard R. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 124-125.
William Withers, The Economic Crisis in Latin America (London:
Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1964), p. 198.
The subsequent presidency of Goulart was checked by the right
wing of the army because of communist leanings. The constitution
was amended to establish a parliamentary form of government which
gave much of the power to a premier. The new premier, Tancredo
Neves, was a complete compromiser, and the Congress which elected
him followed conflicting outside pressures. But in the summer of
1962 Neves resigned, and a cabinet crisis followed. President
Goulart, by refusing other prospective premiers, finally induced
Congress to accept Francisco Brochado ad Rocha, a leftist nation-
alist who followed Goulart's policies of relaxing austerity and
of allowing the capture of the Brazilian labor movement by the
communists. A Castro- like revolution thus became a strong pos-
sibility. Goulart's government lined itself up with Latin Ameri-
cans in other nations opposing the Alliance for Progress. In 1962
one of the Brazilian states, Rio Grande do Sul, was allowed to
expropriate properties owned by the International Telegraph Company.
A wave of ant i-Americanism was encouraged. The flow of American
capital into Brazil dried up, and a flight of American and other
capital began. The struggle against inflation started by Quadros
was largely abandoned, until near bankruptcy in foreign short-term
credits forced Dantas, Goulart's finance minister, to return to
some measure of austerity and plead for American loans .5
Withers went on to express the belief that for Brazil to continue to
maintain its growth rate it must now rely on domestic savings assisted
by foreign capital.
It cannot progress through more inflation because it has carried
it to the extreme where domestic saving, through the ploughing-back
process, is finally being retarded and offset by the flight of
capital. There is no way out for Brazil except domestic saving
assisted by foreign capital.
6
Brazil had cut off foreign investment through partial acceptance of
communism, the high rate of inflation, and anti-Yankee feelings. New
investment in Brazil by United States businesses dropped from $218
million in 1959 to $4.5 million in 1964. 7
5Ibid,, pp. 194-195.
6Ibid., p. 198.
7
Ibid
. , p. 197.
In order for the inflationary spiral to be slowed down and
eventually halted, the government would have to cut back its level
of spending, and gain complete onctrol over the labor movement so
as to control wage increases. This has been what the government has
tried to do since the revolution of 1964. There hasn't been enough
time yet to tell how well the government will be able to accomplish
this goal. Economic conditions, at the present, are so bad in Brazil
that it will take some time to see if the government will be able
to control prices.
The management sector of Brazil will now be looked at to
show why this sector of Brazil has been weak and thus has not been
a counter force against the growth of the Communist Party in the
labor sector.
MANAGEMENT
Management: in the private sector of Brazil has largely been
a family affair. Huge family fortunes have been built-up during the
early industrialization and in this way Brazil parallels the early
industrialization of the united States. Mr. Claude McMillan, in his
article on "Industrial Leaders in Latin America ," has compared the
North American manager with the Brazilian. * Some insights into the
thinking of the Brazilian manager can be gained from this comparison.
Comparison Between Managers
The united States manager has come from a society which doesn't
have a distinctive owner-manager class or ruling class. The Brazilian
manager has come from a completely different social class than that of
the North American. The latter has been a member of the elite social
and economic class and he knew it* For example, an executive in the
united States managing five thousand employees may have earned five
times the income of the average American family after taxes. The
Brazilian owner-manager might have enjoyed an income twenty to thirty
times that of the average industrial worker, but the industrial worker
has been much better off than the average Brazilian breadwinner.
The threat of competition probably has inspired most of the anti-
foreign feeling among Brazil's industrialists, but the industrialists
-'-Claude McMillan, "Industrial Leaders in Latin America," Indus -
trialization and Economic Change (Gainsville: University of Florida
Press, 1965), pp. 71-86.
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have kept these feelings mostly to themselves. Even the most hostile
Brazilian industrial leader has recognized that an attack on foreign
enterprise would be an attack on enterprise itself, and his own
interests would be poorly served by the upheavals these attacks gen-
erated. Nevertheless, these conflicts have shown up intermittently.
Part of the friction has existed because few businessmen from the United
States have bothered to learn to speak Portuguese well. Although most
have learned to carry on a conversation, few will speak the language
when conducting serious business.
The North Americans h^ve attached more importance to written
contracts than have Brazilians. Brazilian managers have viewed the
written agreement as an expression of intent at the time the agreement
was made; the intent deteriorating in value and applicability with
time. The United States executive has preferred to get right down
to business in negotiations and his lack of amenities has not been
shared by the Latins. However, due to economic reasons, United States
executives have learned to adapt with some degree of effectiveness to
the differences in culture.
Because of the cultural heritage of the Brazilians, there has
been a strong paternalistic and patriarchal quality to Brazilian manage-
ment leadership. This has been reflected in employee-employer relation-
ships.
The Brazilian leader doesn't invite middle management to
participate in decision making. He is highly suspicious of
merit rating and wage system in which reward is tied to measur-
able output. Nor does he vigorously emphasize trs ining^develop-
ment, and upgrading, which enable the worker to pass from a
lower to a higher status. As an economic decision maker, he
12
views labor as having a fixed capacity to produce. He feels
that total labor costs are minimized by paying the lowest pos-
sible wage, which is usually the legal minimum wage. If out-
put is insufficient, one simply hires more workers at the
minimum rate.^
The United States executive has been more selective in hiring
a new employee than the Brazilian and has been less likely to tolerate
substandard performance. As the Brazilian regarded the employee as a
ward, he was less likely to let the employee go when qualifications
were not adequate or usefulness was finished. The North Americans
have been more inventive and have provided good working conditions
and opportunities for training, development, and advancement. He has
treated the employee with respect and dignity, paying him well. This
doesn't mean that Brazilian employees have been happy working for
foreigners. Working for a North American has been viewed as being a
lackey of the Yankees and has borne a powerful stigma.
As will be brought out in greater detail later in the paper,
the labor unions in Brazil have been weak because of government con-
trols. Also, unions have been heavily infiltrated with communist
sympathizers so that vhaL union activity that existed has been largely
political rather than economical. As a result, little collective
bargaining has been done in Brazil. Union leaders have been loath to
sit down with management at the bargaining table and discuss problems
of mutual concern, preferring instead to go to the press. For this
reason communication between manager and worker has been largely cut
off, and the United States manager has been less aware of the state of
2
Ibid., p. 37.
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mind of his employees than he would be if he managed in the United
States.
Middle Management
Both ownership and management of Brazilian industry has, in the
past, been a family affair. While close family control was needed at
first because there wasn't a management sector upon which the Brazilian
owner could draw, it has held back the development of this sector. The
extent to which family contro 1 has been practiced is pointed out by the
following statements:
Nepotism and family ties still serve as key factors in staffing
decisions throughout much of Latin America, even in large private
firms.
3
The family idea here is strong, you get a young fellow with
ability and he works hard expecting to get ahead and then along
comes the 20 year old son of the owner and he's the boss. It dis-
courages people who are not relatives. Of course, it's pretty
important to have close family control at the top because you
need absolute loyalty. No one in Brazil considers it dishonest
to cheat the government. But to cheat you need close family
type management and control. You can not afford to let outsiders
in. You have to keep management in the family.
4
So there has existed a situation where close family control has helped
to keep middle management from developing. There have been a couple of
other reasons for the tight family control in Brazil as pointed out by
the following statement on anti-trust legislation.
Richard N. Farmer and Barry M. Richman, Comparative Management
and Economic Progress (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1965), p. 169.
Si, 0. Oberg, "Cross Cultural Perspective on Management Prin-
ciples," Journal of the Academy of Management , Vol. VI, No. 2 (June,
1963), pp. 135-136.
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In Brazil an agreement among businessmen designed to prevent
or reduce competition may be considered a criminal offense if it
is managed for the purpose of obtaining an arbitrary increase in
profits.
5
Another reason for the need for close control has been that the
Constitution of Brazil has had a provision for profit sharing on the
part of the worker. Heare and Frohlich explained this as follows:
The Constitutional provisions with regard to labor include
the precept that legislation shall provide for obligatory and
direct participation of the worker in the profits of concerns,
on the terms and in the manner provided by laws. Bills govern-
ing profit-sharing have been considered by Congress but none
as yet has been enacted.
&
While no bills have passed Congress on this subject, they have been
considered. A firm would need the loyalty of its managers so as to
keep labor and the government guessing as to the exact level of
profits if such a bill were ever passed. Without professional
management, this loyalty couldn't be assured.
With middle management being passed up for higher positions
so as to maintain tight family control, there is little wonder that
management in Brazil has been scarce. Mr. McMillan in the same article
on the industrial leaders of Latin America made some generalizations
about the middle manager. He stated that the middle manager comes
from the middle class which he estimated to account for about 15 percent
of the Brazilian population.? This middle class has been insecure and
Wendell C. Gordon, The Political Economy of Latin America
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 68.
^Gertrude Heare and William Frohlich, "Establishing a Business
in Brazil," Overseas Business Reports , OBR 63-149 (December, 1963), p. 16.
7McMillan, op_. cit
. , pp. 29-31,
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volatile. It has harbored feelings that respectability was associated
with land ownership rather than with commerce. This member may have
run the technical and professional affairs of business and government,
but his roots have remained in the soil. The middle manager has been
a part of this social class, but has left politics to the other members
of the class—the professionals, the intellectuals, the civil servants,
and the labor leaders. Mr. McMillan gave these three points as the
middle manager's position on business and industry.
(1) He demands government protection from competition, par-
ticularly foreign. (2) He expects direct or indirect government
subsidy. (3) He does not oppose government ownership or manage-
ment of industry.
8
This attitude has been a result of a long tradition of heavy government
protection in industry through import tariffs. This tariff protection
has not been unique to Latin America, but in Latin America protection
has bred dependence on the government. Lacking adequate domestic
competition, industry has not achieved competitive efficiency.
Management Training
The answer to the problem of a lack of managers would seem
to be that foreign investors should staff their companies with their
own managers. This, of course, has been done to some extent, but
limitations have been put on aliens by the Brazilian government. Heare
and Frohlich explain these limitations in the following statements:
8
Ibid., p. 31,
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Foreigners may be employed in Brazil only if they have obtained
permanent visas to enter the country or have been granted special
visas as contract employees to remain in Brazil for the length of
the contract.
To obtain a permanent visa a United States citizen must apply to
a Brazilian consular office in the United States, Upon his arrival
in Brazil he must register immediately with the police in the locality
in which he intends to reside and must obtain an identity card. Em-
ployers are not permitted to engage aliens locally who do not have
permanent status and whose documents are not in order.
A temporary or temporary special visa may be granted to scientists,
teachers, lecturers, sportsmen, artists, persons under contract, bus-
inessmen, and commercial travelers. Persons under contract may exer-
cise their professions in Brazil as outlined in the section, Nation-
ality Restrictions. However, they may not practice their professions
for the general public...
Two-thirds of all employees of commercial and industrial firms
must be Brazilians and two-thirds of the entire pay roll must be paid
to Brazilians.
^
If the number of foreign managers has been limited by law, why
haven't foreign capitalists hired men out of college and trained their
own as has been the case in the United States? First of all, the elabo-
rate management training programs that are so common in the United States
have been unknown in Brazil. The only school of business administration
in Brazil was started with the help of a group of United States pro-
fessors in Sao Paulo. The young manage has been largely trained by
experience. The lack of good, or in this case any, training for manage-
ment is pointed out in the statements below which were made by Brazilian
businessmen.
Our businessmen have had no training. In many cases a man
gets to be director because he's the only man available, not be-
cause he's well qualified or the best man for the job.
9
Heare and Frohlich, 0£. cit • , p. 15.
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We can't get good management trainees. The universities don't
produce them. We tried to get good men from the university. They
haven't worked out. The people who are managers have all started
as clerks.
We need to decentralize but we can't. We don't have any people
to give the responsibility to. 10
There have been few schools in Brazil that would produce business-
men and there have been few people, qualified for college, that would
enter the profession if training had been available. This has been true
of young people in all of Latin America not just those in Brazil. William
Stokes in his article, "The Drag of the Pensadores," has stated that the
intellectuals of Latin America haven't wanted to become businessmen or
go into any profession that has had anything to do with manual labor.
^
The reason for this has stemmed not only from the characteristics of the
university system, but also from the feeling of Latin Americans toward
education itself. Higher education has been considered to be the maxi-
mem status in any community. When the university system was first
started in Latin America the only people that could afford to get an
education were the wealthy. Therefore, among the rich and the landholders,
education was, and is, regarded as an important status symbol. As all
the people in Latin merica have aspired to obtain the wealth needed
so that they wouldn't have to work, a degree from a university has been
an indication that they have reached that status.
100berg, o£. cit
. , p. 106.
^Hjilliam Stokes, "The Drag of the Pensadores," Foreign Aid
Reexamined (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), pp. 56-85.
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Learning has been regarded as a value in itself, and therefore
the courses offered in the universities have tended to be theoretical,
non-empirical, and non-utilitarian. The wealthy in the past sought
education only for the social status it would bring them and not for
the knowledge or training that could be used to increase their wealth
or power.
Today as in the past, symbols of education are still passionately
sought and the service to the community which these titles should guarantee
is largely avoided. Mr. Stokes puts it in this manner: "Almost everyone
wants to be a doctor who does not practice, a doctor of pharmacy who does
not mix prescriptions, a doctor of engineering who does not build, even
a doctor of veterinary science who does not personally inject the diseased
animal with the medicine it needs. "*2
Law, medicine, and engineering have been the three most sought
after degrees. Of the three, only engineering could help Brazil by
providing the technical skills needed for industrialization, but the
engineers have been unable to because they have possessed only theo-
retical knowledge. Law has been the most commonly sought after degree;
there being over thirty schools of law in Brazil. A student could
usually obtain a doctorate in Brazil after the fifth year, and in
doing so rarely has had to do any original research. *3
As was mentioned before, manual labor and technical activity
have had low social status. The highest status has belonged to those
12Ibid
. , p. 70.
13Ibid
. , p. 73.
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who have lived in ostentation without labor of any kind. Professions
which have been obviously disassociated from manual productive labor
have had the highest status among the workers. Some of these jobs
have been top level bureaucrat, lawyer, poet, priest, and general.
Government employment has been widely sought. There hasn't been any
incentive for people that have been the best educated to use their brains
and hands in productive areas. For this reason there hasn't been a
great rush of people to enter the business administration field or
other fields from which technical management could be drawn.
In summary, we can say that the Brazilian manager has not been
the professional that his counterpart in the United States has been.
The tightly held corporations have restricted the number of managers
which a growing industrial economy needs to ensure the most economical
allocation of resources. Also, businesses haven't been able to import
all the managers needed because of government restrictions, and they
haven't been able to find young Brazilian students to train because
there haven't been any in the business administration field. College
graduates haven't wanted to become managers.
Social conditions and the attitudes, opinions, assumptions,
and motives of individuals which go hand- in-hand with these conditions
change very slowly. People in Brazil are not going to want to become
businessmen, nor are existing businessmen in Brazil going to become
professionals over night. The accomplishment of both events will
probably move fairly closely with the industrialization of Brazil.
Greater industrialization will force the Brazilian manager to become a
professional or to cease to exist as a businessman. With more
20
industrialization will come greater competition which will help force
managerial control out of the hands of a few family relatives. This
will, in turn, bring about greater opportunities for young men in the
field of business.
Neither of these events are likely to take place in the near
future, but will require time enough for an evolutionary change in the
social structure. Foreign investors will probably have to continue to
send what people they can to Brazil to act as managers. These men still
will have to train their middle managers on the job. The lack of ef-
fective management will be just another expense in doing business in
Brazil.
The greatest cost of this lack of good management has been in
the area of poor labor relations. The results of this ineptness will
be pointed out in the section on labor laws and collective bargaining.
The paper will now look at the laborer to see the extent to which he
is qualified to work in an industrialized economy, and the effect
that industrialization has had on him.
THE WORKER
Economic State of the Worker
The Brazilian worker, for the most part, has been miserably
poor, having benefitted little from industrialization. He has been
exploited for centuries by his leaders so that poverty has been nothing
new, but it should not be surprising that he would turn to the com-
munists or any other organization for help if they could show some
promise of a better life. A quotation by Peter Nehemkis clearly points
out the situation.
We know that this development of which we are so proud has
brought about no change at all in the living conditions of three-
fourths of the country's population. Its main feature has been
a growing concentration of income, both socially and geograph-
ically. The large mass of people who toil in the fields and
constitute the majority of the Brazilian population have reaped
no benefit. Worse than that, the masses have witnessed a rela-
tive decline in their standard of living as compared to those
engaged in commerce and other services. As for the industrial
workers, who represent a sort of middle class in the Brazilian
social framework, they have grown both in absolute and relative
terms, without having improved their standard of living to any
large extent. They, too, have suffered a relative worsening
of their economic position as compared to higher income groups
employed in urban services.
*
Further explanation of the extent of the poverty is seen in
these statements by Alexander and Withers.
1
Peter Nehemkis, Latin America, Myth and Reality (New York:
Alfred A. Knope, 1964), p. 198.
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The favellows of Rio de Janeiro are among the most depressing
slums to be found anywhere. •• As a result of his poverty, the
Brazilian worker suffers from undernourishment.
2
In 1953, per capita income, according to Kindleberger, was
only $215 per year. More recent estimates have set the current
per capita income at $250 per year. But this is an average for
the country. In the poverty-stricken northeast, incomes are as
low as $50 a year... Prices have increased 600 per cent from
1948 to 1959... In some months during these years of inflation,
prices increased 5-10 per cent and a 50 per cent annual price
rise has been regarded as below normal. Wages have normally
lagged 15 percent behind prices, and inflation has amounted
to a 15 per cent sales tax on labor each year.
3
This still hasn't given the true picture of the income of the
masses. The tax system in Brazil has been mostly regressive in nature,
and in this way has put the burden of supporting the government on the
shoulders of those least able to do so. From Table 16 in the appendix
it can be seen that three- fourths of the tax revenues in Brazil come
from indirect taxes which put the greatest burden of payment on the
lower classes.
Worker Education and Productivity
The laborer of Brazil has been uneducated and not qualified for
most industrial work. For this reason, much of management's time
must be spent trying to fit the right man to the job. The following
quotations show the extent of illiteracy and what has been some of its
effects:
2
Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and
Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), p. 49.
ft
"'William Withers, The Economic Crisis in Latin America (London:
Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1964), p. 198.
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The state of Rio Grande do Sul boasts the highest literacy
rate in Brazil; yet one- third of its adult citizens cannot read
or write, and there is a great lack of good, compulsory primary
education. Only 18% of the inhabitants of this state have fin-
ished four grades of primary school. (The figures for high school
and university are 2.57, and 0.5% respectively) .4
Although the literacy has improved significantly in the post-
war period, probably fewer than 50 per cent of the population
over 5 years of age can read or write. The rate varies among the
geographic regions, depending mainly upon the degree of urbani-
zation...
Primary education for children 7 to 12 years of age is free
and compulsory. However, schooling is frequently poor or not
available, especially in sparsely populated areas,
5
Here was how businessmen in Brazil in a survey made by Oberg
felt about the education problem.
The basic problem in Brazil is the weakness of primary education,
It is difficult to get good help. Workers are willing and intel-
ligent, but they have had only four years of schooling and they
can't do simple arithmetic problems.
One big problem is the low quality of primary schools in
Brazil. Workers can't understand technical orders.
We can buy machinery easier than we can get good men to run
machinery. It takes up to two years to train a good lathe man.
There is a real shortage of good technical people in the shop
and office.
We have to train our mechanics. We can't hire any. Then we
have the problem that when you train a man you often lose him.
Other companies hire him away from you after you've spent the time
and money to train him.
6
^Richard N. Farmer and Barry M. Richman, Comparative Management
and Economic Progress (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1965), pp. 76-77.
^U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor in Brazil," RLS Report
No. 191 (January, 1962), p. 27.
°W. Oberg, "Cross Cultural Perspectives on Management Prin-
ciples," Journal of the Academy of Management , Vol. VI, No. 2 (June,
1963), pp. 76-77.
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Part of the reason for the inadequacy in the primary education
system has stemmed from the fact that few qualified teachers have wanted
to teach at this level. The main reason though has been the lack of
funds available for primary education. Claude McMillan has put it in
this way. "Sixty per cent of all the expenditures for education each
year goes for the education of some 80,000 Brazilians in university-
level institutions; 30 per cent goes for about 800,000 who never go
beyond the secondary level; and 10 per cent goes for five million that
complete elementary school only."'
Table 1 shows the severe lag in the country's educational system
relative to economic growth of the country. Part A of the table gives
an estimate of the educational level of people occupied in various
economic sectors. It can be seen that in the tertiary sector only
30 per cent of the men and 45 per cent of the women have finished
primary education. Part B in the table shows the rate of growth of
people graduating from the various levels of education in the nine-
teen fifties. At each level of education the rate of growth has been
below the rate of population growth of 3.6 per cent during the period.
Part C shows the breakdown of expenditures of the federal government for
education. Notice the small percentage that has gone for primary edu-
cation. From 1950 to 1960 the amount of the federal budget spent on
education dropped from 9.5 to 6.1 per cent of the total budget."
7
Claude McMillan, "Industrial Leaders in Latin America,"
Industrialization and Economic Change (Gainsville: University of
Florida Press, 1965), p. 84.
Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development in
Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard R. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 188.
25
TABLE 1
Imbalances and Bottlenecks In the Brazilian Economy
A. Educational Level of Population in Main Sectors of Economic Activity,
1962.
Percent of People Employed Having Finished the
Following Education Levels
Primary Secondary Higher Education
Sectors Men Women Men Women Men Women
Primary 5.01 4.0% 0.1* --
Secondary 20.3 39.1 4.2 2.6% 0.9* —
Tertiary 30.0 45.0 16.0 25.0 8.0 5.0%
Source: Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, op. cit
. , p. 89. This is based
on an estimated work force of 20.9 million men and 3.6 million women.
B. Yearly Rate of Growth of Number of Students Graduating (In Period
1950-60)
Higher Education
Agronomists
Engineers
Medicine
Secondary schools* .
Commercial schools
.
Industrial schools.
Teacher 'g training schools
Agricultural schools
Primary schools . •
Students matriculating in primary schools..
Teaching staff of primary schools
Rate of Absolute Numbers
Growth 1950 1960
6.9% 171 332
4.9 961 1,550
3.7 1,070 1,540
7.2 60,048 120,125
6.1 16,457 29,734
2.5 2,825 3,624
8.4 10,114 22,714
11.4 613 1,796
2.6
3.6
5.1
University preparatory
Source : Anuario Estatistico
C. Expenditures on Education in 1960 (In Millions of Cr$s)
Federal 15,359 Federal Breakdown
States 32,158 Primary education 1,520
Municipal 4,392 Secondary education 3,905
Total 51,909 Higher education 8,111
Other 1,823
Total 15,359
Source: Special data made available to author by the Ministry
of Education.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
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Low educational levels, the high rate of illiteracy, and the
lack of technical training have seriously limited the expansion of
the skilled labor force and consequently hampered the economic develop-
ment of the country. The National Economic Council of Brazil estimated
that 80 per cent of the wage earners in Brazil were unskilled, while 16
per cent are skilled. The other four per cent were Armed Forces, clerical
and administrative personnel, and professional workers.
9
The lack of training among the unskilled has made them undisci-
plined in industrial procedures, and they have rebelled by moving from
job to job as opportunities develop. This is further reiterated in the
following statement:
Brazil appears to have a high labor turnover rate. The lack of
industrial discipline among the unskilled and the practice of dis-
missing workers a few years before they have acquired legal senority
status are among the more important factors which result in high turn-
over. Absenteeism is also a major problem in many types of acti-
vities.^
Worker Training
Brazilian management has recognized the need for trained people
and has acted to try to reduce this lack of skilled workers. Most of
this work has been done through the SENAI organization or government
training programs. These programs have worked as follows:
90berg, pjp_. cit. , pp. 76-77.
" U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor in Brazil," BLS Report 191
(January, 1962), p. 12.
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Full-time vocational training for industrial work is provided
as part of the educational system, under the direction of the Min-
istry of Education and Culture, which offers three types of courses:
a 4-year industrial course in subjects such as electronics, printing,
industrial arts, and metal trades; a 3-year technical course in sub-
jects such as mechanical engineering and draftsmanship; and a 2-
year master craftsman course including a variety of subjects.
Part-time and full-time vocational training for industrial
trades is provided by the National Industrial Apprenticeship Ser-
vice (SENAI) , which is administered by the overall organization of
employer federations (The National Confederation of Industry) , and
financed by a 1.5 percent tax on total payroll. Employers are re-
quired to hire and train some apprentices through SENAI for skilled
occupations, and to train some young people for every type of oc-
cupation in the establishment. The minimum number in the former
group must be 5 percent of total employment and in the latter may
vary, but need not exceed 3 percent.
For young people, SENAI offers four types of courses: compulsory
courses for young workers, aged 14 to 18, who are apprentices in the
skilled trades in such fields as machine tool operation and electrical,
radio, and foundry work; accelerated 5-month training programs in
the evening for youths over age 16 with no previous vocational train-
ing; prevocational courses for worker's sons 12 to 14 years of age,
who have finished primary education but are too young to go to work;
and vocational courses for employed children 14 to 18 years of age,
nonapprenticed, for a period of 20 to 30 months. The law requires
the employer to pay the young employees during the training period,
provided they follow the vocational training program. Sometimes
these programs include preliminary training over a 5-month period
to complete the general education of the young worker who has not
finished primary school.
SENAI offers vocational training for adults, usually in evening
classes, over a 5-month period. SENAI has also provided some train-
ing for instructors and foremen through summer school sessions.
The SENAI program is well known throughout Latin America. During
its 18 years of operation, it has added materially to the number of
skilled and semiskilled workers in Brazil, but has not been able to
supply enough trained industrial workers to meet the demands.
H
The SENAI program has been an exceptionally good program, but
has been able to handle only 40 to 50 thousand students at a time, a
Ibid
. ,
p. 13.
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fairly tiny fraction of the labor force. ** Companies could partly solve
the problem of lack of skilled workers by bringing in workers from
abroad. They have been limited in this, however, by the immigration
laws which have been previously mentioned, and by the additional fact
that discrimination in pay between persons doing the same work has been 11
legal. Heare and Frolich stated:
...if a Brazilian and a foreigner perform similar duties, the
Brazilian may not receive renumeration less than that given the
foreigner unless certain circumstances act to increase the pay
received by the foreigner. Government control is effected by
requiring an annual report of all employees, indicating their
positions or duties. 13
In most cases, skilled workers would have to be paid more than the going
wage rate in Brazil in order to entice them to come to Brazil. But the
Brazilian industrialist has not been allowed to do this unless he has
been willing to pay the same wage to Brazilian workers who have been
performing similar duties. Thus a manager can either not bring in
skilled workers from other countries or raise the wage scale for the
already employed Brazilian workers.
Since the revolution of April, 1964, the government has kept a
close eye on the needs of management. If management were to push for
more funds for primary or secondary education, they could probably win
their point. The real problem would be to find the funds to pay for
this increased spending for education. Inflation in Brazil won't be
12
Baer, oj>. cit
. , p. 97.
13
Gertrude Heare and William Frohlich, "Establishing a Business
in Brazil," OBR 63-149 (December, 1963), p. 15.
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slowed down by more government deficit spending. Business itself
probably would have to bear the greatest burden for providing funds
for education. There might be some reluctance on the part of business-
men to pay increased taxes for workers who wouldn't be eligible for the
work force for from 6 to 9 years. Businessmen will probably want to in-
vest their profits in something that will show quicker results. The
fact remains that educating and training factory workers will remain
just another cost of doing business in Brazil.
Characteristics of the Worker
Although the average Brazilian worker has remained illiterate
and lacked training, he has also been ambitious, hard working, and
for the most part docile and tolerant. All of these characteristics, along
with having been exploited for generations, have made the Brazilian worker
a prime target for the communists. The worker has wanted to get ahead
but couldn't because of lack of education and/or training. His ambition
has made him move from job to job as better opportunities have arisen.
At the very least, the Brazilian Communist Party has been able to promise
the worker better pay than he was receiving; and, so far the party has
been able to produce results. With the crack-down on the communists
after the revolution, the advantages of joining the communist party or
of joining a communist controlled labor party were now sorely limited.
But the fact remains, if the communists were able to get control of the
government, the worker's docility would probably prevent him from ever
throwing the communists out, and a Castro-like regime would be possible.
The docility of the Brazilian has stemmed from his ancestry. Most
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workers have been descendants of slaves, serfs, or poor immigrants.
These people have had to look to the land-owning patron for their very
existence. As a result, the patron has become a father image, something
the people can lean on. Getulio Vargas was able to transfer this father
image to the state by the use of social security legislation and labor
laws that were designed to benefit the worker. Vargas was able to play
strongly on the father-state ties and at the same time keep strict
control over the unions. The way this was done will be explained in
the next chapter.
One of the results of the father-state idealization has been
the moving of some of the best workers from industry into government
and teaching professions. This, in turn, has held down the number of
skilled workers.
LABOR LEGISLATION
Some of the labor laws and the effect they have had on drawing
the worker to the state rather than to the unions will now be examined.
Then the social security system with all of its faults and what it really
has done for the worker will be discussed.
Labor Laws
From 1931 to 1945 many labor laws were passed by the Vargas
regime so as to hold the loyalty of the worker to the state. These
included:
. . .minimum wage legislation, which went into effect for the
first time in 1941, and the development of the social security
system which, creaking and bureaucratic though it was, brought
health protection to worker, and established retirement pen-
sions. 1
Minimum wage has worked somewhat differently in Brazil than
in the United States, and since 1960 it has played some role in in-
creasing inflation. The law is described below.
Legal minimum wage rates are fixed from time to time by the
Federal Government. The minimum scale now in effect was estab-
lished by decree-law No. 51,613 of December 3, 1962, and became
effective on January 1, 1963. Because of the inflationary situ-
ation in Brazil, the legal minimum scale has been revised annually
in recent years. Pressure for a semi-annual revision has been
reported.
The minimum monthly wage rates provided by law vary according
to the geographical region of the country. The highest prevail
^Richard N. Farmer and Barry M. Richman, Comparative Management
and Economic Progress (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1965), p. 86.
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in the Rio de Janeiro—Sao Paul--Belo Horizonte area, with rates in
the extreme south and in the Amazon region somewhat lower and in the
northeast generally on a further descending scale. The range is from
9,000 to 12,000 cruzeiros per month* The minimum wage for apprentices
under 18 years of age is 50 percent of the minimum for adults.
2
Minimum rates are based on cost of living studies and recom-
mendations, submitted to the President by the State and Territorial
Minimum Wage Commissions, with any amendments that the Minister of
Labor and Social Security may make. Zones and sub-zones may be
established within these larger regions so that differences in
standards of living may be taken into account in setting minimum
wages.
3
In most countries provisions for raising the "minima" with the
passage of time have been more or less formalized. Generally, this
can be done by executive decree. It does not require congressional
action as it does in the United States.
In Brazil, for example, the minimum in Rio de Janeiro in 1962
was 21,000 curzeiros a month (something like $40). As a result of
inflation and other pressures, the figure had been raised to 42,000
by 1964.
4
In addition to the minimum wage, employers have had to pay a
so-called "thirteenth month salary bonus" each year to all employees.
This was Law No. 4,090 made on July 13, 1962 which provided:
...that in December of each year, the employer will pay to
each employee a bonus equal to one-twelfth of his monthly salary,
for each month of employment during the year. For purposes of
the computation, employment of 15 days or more in a month is con-
sidered a full month.
5
o
Gertrude Heare and William Frohlich, "Establishing a Business
in Brazil," Overseas Business Reports , OBR 63-149 (December, 1963), p. 16.
3
U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor in Brazil," BLS Report 191
(January, 1962), p. 15.
4
Wendell C. Gordon, The Political Economy of Latin America
(New York: Columbia Press, 1965), p. 68.
5
Heare and Frolich, pj). cit . , p. 16.
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The normal working hours for commercial and industrial establish-
ments have been fixed by the government at 8 hours per day and 48 hours
per week. Overtime in most occupations must be paid at the rate of
time and a fifth, and there have been certain restrictions existing as
to the amount of overtime permitted. For work on holidays, a special
permit must be obtained from the Ministry of Labor. Brazil has many
more holidays than the United States. For example, Independence Day
is celebrated for a full week.
The Brazilian employee has also been entitled to other benefits
as described below.
The Constitution contains the precept that employees are
entitled to a remunerated weekly day of rest, preferably Sunday,
and to remuneration for civil and religious holidays. Law No.
605 of January 5, 1949, put this provision into effect. Employers
are required to pay day laborers for a weekly day of rest. Em-
ployees paid on a semimonthly or monthly basis are not affected,
provided the employers deduct for absences on a 30-day basis.
After 1 year's employment a worker is entitled to a paid vaca-
tion of 20 working days. Provision for a shorter period of vaca-
tion is made for those who have worked less than a year or who
have been absent without sufficient justification for a certain
number of working days. If an employee is not granted a vacation
with full pay, he is entitled to double pay for the non-granted
vacation.
6
There has also been a part of the Constitution regulating
employment of minors and women. Heare and Frolich's description of
this follows:
The Constitution prohibits minors under 14 years of age from
working, and the employment of those between ages 14 and 18 is
subject to various conditions. Minors may be employed only when
they hold an identity card issued by the Ministry of Labor; work
Ibid
. , p. 16.
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between the ours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. is prohibited; certain
types of work, such as the handling of noxious chemicals and ex-
plosives, work in excessively hot, cold, or damp atmospheres,
or involving the cleaning of machinery in motion, may not be
undertaken; and employers must allow minors time off to attend
classes.
Legislation regulating the employment of women prohibits work
between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. in most occupations, as
well as work in dangerous or unheaithful occupations. No work
may be performed for a period of 6 weeks before and after child-
birth and during this period the employee has a right to receive
full pay. In the case of miscarriage, she is entitled to 2 weeks'
rest with full pay. If a woman is nursing her child, she has the
right to two special daily periods of rest from work during the
first 6 months following childbirth. If more than 30 women work
in an establishment located in a place where there are no day
nurseries for accommodation of the babies of employed mothers,
the competent authorities may in their judgment require the
establishment to provide a place where women may leave, during
working hours, children who are being nursed.
7
This part of Che constitution hasn't been too important as the
women's place has been in the home in Brazil. Minors have been hired,
but mostly fo, training under SENAI
.
Not only has it been expensive to hire a person in Brazil, the
constitution has made it expensive to fire them. In specific circum-
stances employees have been entitled to dismissal pay as explained
below:
This is payable at the rate of 1 month's wages for each year
(or "raction over 6 months) of service performed up to 9% years.
After 10 years of service, the worker acquires permanent status
and may not be dismissed except for a serious offense, or force
majeure, that is, circumstances adversely affecting the business
and over which the employer has no control, both duly proven. If
a concern goes out of business for reasons other than force majeure,
the employer must pay all employees with 10 or more years of ser-
vice severance pay amounting to 2 month's pay for every year of
service. Workers are frequently dismissed, it is often stated,
with their accumulated terminal pay, after as much as 7 or 8
years' service.
' U. S. Department of Labor % op . cit . , p. 32.
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If such reports are true, the miscarriage of a law intended to
guarantee the worker's right of tenure and to protect him against
unjust dismissal, especially in his later life, thus works to his
disadvantage. The employer is likewise adversely affected in the
long run since the resulting high rate of labor turnover adds to
labor costs and also seriously retards the acquisition of highly
developed industrial skills by the labor force.
The law requires, under penalty provisions, that employers
and employees give notice if either wants to terminate the em-
ployment relationship. Although notice must be given, an in-
demnity is not payable to an employee if he has less than 1
year of service or if he is working under contract for a speci-
fied term. 8
Although no study was found on the number of employees having
tenure, all texts agreed that it has been a factor in increasing the
labor turnover and increasing labor costs, "...in an industrializing
society such rapid turnover is quite costly in terms of loss of skill,
work-in requirements of new workers, etc. "9 It should be mentioned
that the above laws would cover only about 40 percent of the working
population.
The difference between Brazilian labor laws and labor laws in
the United States might be expressed by the fact that benefits such as
pay on holidays, vacation time and work bonuses, which would be covered
by collective bargaining in the United States, have been guaranteed
the Brazilian by law. The tenure law seems to be completely unworkable
and should be taken off the books. No information has been found to
indicate whether bills to appeal this law have been brought before the
Brazilian Congress either before or after the revolution.
^Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development in
Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 97.
yU. S. Department of Labor, oj>. cit
. , p. 33.
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Social Welfare Legislation
In 1963 there were nearly four million workers insured by Brazil's
seven National Social Security Institutes, which have been under the
supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, The seven
institutes are as follows: (1) The Industrial Workers* Retirement
and Pension Fund; (2) The Commercial Workers' Retirement and Pension
Pund; (3) The Transportation and Cargo Workers" Retirement and Pension
Institute; (4) The Maritime Woerkers 1 Retirement and Pension Institute;
(5) The Railway and Public Utility Workers' Retirement and Pension
Institute; (6) The Bank Workers* Retirement and Pension Institute; (7)
The Government Workers' Social Security and Assistance Institute. In
addition to this, the families of insured workers have been eligible
for certain benefits. The benefits under the Social Security Act of
1960 are uniform for all Institutes. The U. S. Department of Law re-
lates the following benefits:
Old-Age Pension . At age 55 with 35 years of service, any employee
may retire and receive monthly an amount equal to the full amount
of his average monthly wage during the 12 months prior to retire-
ment. At age 55 with 30 years of service, an employee may retire
with 80 percent of his average monthly wage. At age 65, with less
than 30 years of service, an employee may retire with 70 percent
of his average pay during the last 12 months of employment. In
order to encourage continuation on the job after fulfilling the
age and service requirements, workers may draw 25 percent of their
pensions in addition to their wages, during additional years of
employment.
Survivor's Pension . Widows of pensioners receive 50 percent of the
amount of the pension, plus 10 percent for each male child under 18
and for each unmarried daughter regardless of age, up to a limit of
100 percent of the pension.
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Assistance During Illness. Employers are responsible for continuing
Tforker's full wage payments during the first 2 weeks of illness. There-
after, the social security agency pays benefits equal to 70 percent
of the regular wage, plus additional increments based on length of
service in insured employment. To be eligible for sickness benefits,
a worker must have been a contributor to an Institute for at least
1 year.
Disability Pension . When a worker is permanently Incapacitated for
employment, he receives a pension equal to 70 percent of his former
wage. The Institutes are directed to establish vocational rehabili-
tation courses for the benefit of workers who have become disabled
for their usual occupations but who may be able to do other work upon
receiving training.
Maternity Benefit . This type of Benefit is paid to an insured
worker when his wife gives birth to a child or, in the case of a
woman worker, directly to her. Under the 1960 Act, the amount is
a lump sum equal to twice the legal monthly minimum wage payable
at the place of employment of the insured worker. In localities
in which hospitalization is available to the families of the in-
sured, and the cost of maternity hospitalization is borne by the
Institute, only the minimum wage amount for 1 month is granted.
Burial Benefit . This type of Benefit is paid to the spouse of an
insured worker when he dies, or to whoever takes charge of burial
arrangements, and is equal to twice the legal monthly minimum wage.
Workmen's Compensation . Business firms are required by law to
carry insurance against the risk of damage claims by injured work-
men. Such insurance uiuy be purchased through private insurance
companies, which are the primary insurers, or through M*"? Social
Security Institutes. Compensation paid by an employer co an
injured workman is separate from the disability payments and
medical assistance he receives under the Social Insurance program.
Other Programs . All of the Social Security Institutes contribute
toward the cost of two other social security agencies which are
likewise operated by tripartite boards. One.. .to which each
Institute allocates 5 percent of its total revenue from employer
and employee contributions, plus a share of its income from other
sources was established to develop distribution facilities for
lower coat food. It has opened several supermarkets in some of
the large industrial cities, provided low-cost meals to workers
in factories, and operated low-cost restaurants. The other...
provides ambulance service and first aid treatment, mainly in
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, to workers at home or at their jobs. 10
1Q
Ibid
. » p. 33.
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There have been several major weaknesses in the Brazilian social
security system. First, the fact that there hive been seven social se-
curity systems instead of one has led to a duplication of functions
which has increased the overhead and operating costs. Another weakness
in the system has been the fact that the funds have come from tripartite
contributions by the workers, the employers, and the government. The
government has been particularly lax in paying its share, and usually
has paid only when there has been a crisis in the system. The government,
however, hasn't been the only delinquent party. Alexander stated that some
social security officials have claimed that some employers deduct workers 1
contributions, but do not pass them on.**
Since the revolution the army has demanded that the private
businesses pay all of their taxes. Because private enterprise owed
the army for its very existence, private businesses have probably
complied with the demand. There wasn't any information available
upon which a speculation could be made on how long they will continue
to do so.
Many workers have complained about the red-tape necessary to
get the benefits to which they are entitled. Also, there have been
complaints about political interference in the administration of the
funds. Whenever there has been a change in the Ministry of Labor
there usually has been a change in the administration of the social
security funds. It should be noted that old-age pensions are enjoyed
Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil,,
and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 101-102.
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by only the very few who survive to the age of sixty-five.
The payments for these benefits have come mostly from the
employer and the employee. The complexity in figuring the amount
to be paid and the costliness of the system can be seen from the
quotation below:
The industrial employer and the employee each is required to
contribute to the employee's social security fund 8 percent of
the employee's monthly salary. The maximum monthly wage base for
the contribution is five times the highest minimum wage in effect
in the country. On the basis of the minimum wage scale which be-
came effective on January 1, 1963, the social contribution thus
is computed on a maximum of 105,000 curzeiros monthly.
The employer also pays, on the basis of wages paid, the fol-
lowing contributions: 2 percent for the social service funds
having as their objectives measures contributing to the health
and welfare of employees; 1 percent for the apprenticeship insti-
tutes; one-half of 1 percent for medical assistance for the groups
covered by the pensions funds; and 0.3 percent for the Rural Social
Service Fund.
Employers must pay to each employee, for every dependent child
under 14 years of age, an additional salary of 5 percent of the
local minimum wage (Law No. 4,266, October 3, 1963). The employer
is authorized to deduct the amounts thus paid from his contributions
to the social security fund. However, for the purpose of assisting
in financing the family bonus, the employer must contribute to the
social security fund an amount equal to 6 percent of the local
minimum wage, multiplied by the total number of workers regardless
of their marital status. 12
There can be little doubt that the social security system has
been expensive in Brazil. Alexander has stated that the cost to the
employer has run as high as 50 percent of the total labor bill. 13 This
he said added to the cost of production and probably contributed to in-
flation. No material has been found upon which to compare the cost
12Heare and Frolich, oj>. ci
t
. » p. 17.
13Alexander, op_. cit
. , p. 102.
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of these social benefits to those of the United States or other countries,
or the direct effect of these benefits on the inflationary spiral. All
writers agreed that there has been some correlation.
But for all its weaknesses and possible corruption, the social
security system has provided health aid for the workers which they
could not obtain otherwise. It has helped with the housing problem if
only en a small scale. It has drawn the workers to the state while
at the 3ame time diminishing the importance of the union in the lives
of the workers. The state has succeeded in channeling worker protests
from the unions to the bureaucracy of the state. This in turn has
weakened the influence of the communists as they have been the major
political party representing the unions.
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
The labor movement itself will now be examined; how the labor
unions have been organized; the way collective bargaining and grievance
procedures work; and the control the government has had over the labor
union movement when this control was used. A short look at the char-
acteristics of the labor union leader in Latin America, so as to
better understand his role in the labor movement, will also be taken.
The Syndicates
The current organized trade union movement in Brazil has been
patterned along the lines of syndicate organizations. These organi-
zations bargained with business syndicates with both of these being sub-
ordinate to the State. The syndicate came into being during the regime
of Getulio Vargas as did much of the labor legislation. A syndicate
has been considered to be a voluntary organization since they were
formed by the interested parties and not created by the State. Workers
who wanted to form a syndicate first organized into professional associ-
ations and petitioned the government for the registration of their
association. Until they had been recognized by the Ministry of Labor,
these associations only represented their members. After recognition,
they represented all workers employed in that particular category,
whether or not they were enrolled as members of that syndicate. Over
half of the worker syndicates have been located in the six states of
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Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Guanabara, Parana, and
Santa Catarina.* The syndicates have received funds from the syndical
tax which all workers and employers must pay whether they were members
of the syndicate or not. The way the tax has worked is explained below;
A major source of financial support is provided by a syndical
tax, called the Iraposto Sindical, which for employed persons,
amounts to 1 day's wages per year for each nonagrlcultural worker,
except those in the Government and in domestic service. Employers 1
contributions to their own syndicates are based upon the amount of
their capital investment.
The syndical tax which is required to be paid by employed persons
is deducted from their pay by the employers, who forward it to the
Bank of Brazil... The Bank maintains a separate account for each
syndicate. The law requires each syndicate to transfer 20 percent
of its tax fund to a Social Service Syndicate Fund presided over
by the Ministry of Labor, 15 percent to the federation, and 5 percent
to the confederation to which it belongs... The remaining 60 per-
cent may be used by the syndicate for a variety of health, educa-
tional, and welfare services, as well as for normal trade union
activities which are prescribed by law, and which the Government
must approve. However, such approval is only a formality, and
funds are actually used for a wide variety of other purposes,
including political action.
There has been some resentment against the syndical tax,
particularly on the part of workers, since they must pay it whether
or not there is a union to which they may belong, and since it does
not take the place of the union dues which must be paid if they
want to participate in union meetings and elections. Some unions
also resent the fact that 20 percent of the tax goes to the Govern-
ment. Some trade union leaders object to this tax because of the
resulting control which the Government has over union finances
and operations.
2
Although the unions and the workers may not have liked the tax,
it has made the unions financially strong even though they have been
organizationally weak. Nothing has been found in the literature to
U. S. Department of Labor, "Labor in Brazil," BLS Report No. 191
(January, 1962), p. 25.
2lbid., pp. 25-26.
43
show where this money has gone, but it has been noted that the unions
have been politically inclined.
Most worker syndicates have been affiliated with federations
of workers of a particular category. Federations usually have had a
state as their jurisdictional base. The federations must represent
at least five syndicates and must include groups of workers in iden-
tical or related activities. The federations, in turn, may be assoc-
iated with the general confederations of workers. These must consist
of at least three federations, but may represent more diverse elements.
A confederation has national jurisdiction and represents the workers'
point of view on a federal level. The number of confederations has been
limited by law to seven; five of which have already been organized.
Collective Bargaining
As mentioned above, collective bargaining has been done through
the syndicates. The individual firm hasn't bargained by itself, but
through a syndicate, and the syndicate, in turn, has bargained with a
labor syndicate. All of the bargaining has been done through the labor
courts. These courts not only have been set up to handle collective
agreements, but individual grievance proceedings as well.
To take the place of collective bargaining, the Estado Novo
provided an elaborate system of labor courts, which would handle
not only cases involving violations of labor laws, but things
which, under a collective bargaining system, would be handled
through negotiations for a collective agreement and through a
grievance procedure.
3
^Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argent ina % Brazil ,
and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), p. 49.
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Relations between management and labor unions haven't been very
good in Brazil. Part of the reason for this has been that management
has been content to let the government handle most collective agreements.
As management and the unions never had to settle disputes among themselves,
there wasn't any common ground upon which to settle disputes when the
government began to relax its control over the unions. More will be
said on this subject later, but first the collective bargaining pro-
cedure will be explained. The United States Department of Labor
described it in the following way:
The collective labor contracts, which are made by the worker
and employer syndicates are required by law to establish wages,
hours, and the rights and duties of employers and workers, and
may also contain provisions for the settlement of disputes and
regarding any other matter of interest to the contracting parties...
Each collective contract must be approved by the Ministry of
Labor, which may also make it binding for an entire job category
in industry, regionally or nationally. The collective labor con-
tract must, by law, be approved by a two-thirds vote of the union
membership or, on failure of this, two-thirds of those present at
a subsequent union meeting. Once the union leaders approve, there
is, in practice, usually no question of securing the necessary votes.
Once in effect, it has the force of law, and responsibility for en-
forcement rests with the labor inspectors of the Ministry of
Labor. 4
The collective bargaining process also has had the result of
tying labor to the 3tate rather than the unions. This worked well for
businesses under the Vargas regime when it was pro-business, but when
the government swung the other way and became socialistic during the
presidency of both Quadros and Goulart, businesses didn't fare so well
in the courts. As businesses had never tried to establish any common
4
U. S. Department of Labor, op. cit. , p. 27
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ground upon which to settle bargaining agreements out of court, it was
impossible for the firms to do so at that time.
Labor Courts
The labor courts in Brazil have been distinct from the regular
judicial courts and have been composed of three major divisions: (1)
Local Boards of Conciliation and Judgement, (2) Regional Labor Courts,
and (3) a Superior Labor Tribunal. The following is a description
of the duties of each:
The Local Boards of Conciliation and Judgement or a justice
of the peace if there is no local board, handles employer -employee
conflicts over such matters as the failure to pay salaries, mater-
nity benefits, and dismissal wages. These boards attempt to obtain
an informal agreement between the parties involved in the dispute.
Failing that, they are empowered to arbitrate the case.
The Regional Labor Courts handle (1) disputes arising out
of collective labor agreements, (2) cases where the employer seeks
to discharge for cause an employee with tenure under the 10-year
seniority law, and (3) appeals from the decision of the Boards
of Conciliation and Judgement. These courts also first attempt
conciliation and, failing this, they have the power to resolve a
dispute.
Decisions of the Regional Labor Courts may be appealed to the
Superior Labor Tribunal, whose decisions are usually final, with
possible appeal to the Supreme Court.
5
On all levels of the labor court system there has been a representative
of both labor and management. On the local boards there has been one
representative for each side and the court has been presided over by a
professional judge. At the regional level there has been one repre-
sentative for each side and the court has been presided over by three
professional judges. In the Superior Labor Tribunal, there have been
5
Ibid., p. 28.
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two representatives and five career judges, 6 As can be seen from
Table 2 there have been surprisingly few decisions made by the
regional labor courts , but there has been a steady increase in the
number of decisions which can probably be traced to the gradual re-
laxing of governmental control over the labor unions.
TABLE 2
THE NUMBER OF JUDGMENTS PASSED DOWN BY THE
REGIONAL LABOR COURTS FROM 1945-1954
1945 134
1946 420
1947 295
1948 183
1949 143
1950 134
1951 177
1952 251
1953 376
1954 371
Source: Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina a
Brazil, and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962).
Grievance Procedure
The grievance system has also worked through the same system
of court8. Most of the work done by the local boards has been in the
area of individual grievances. Because of the length of time taken
to get grievances through the courts and the pro- labor feeling of the
government during the late fifties and early sixties, many businesses
have started to set up their own grievance procedures. From Table 3
it can be seen that the number of grievances has increased tremendously
6
Alexander, op_, cit
• , pp. 90-91.
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TABLE 3
GRIEVANCES HANDLED BY JUNTAS DE CONCILIACAO
Year
Grievances
Received Solved
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
16,979
21,599
24,084
36,402
45,916
62,110
60,568
51,388
69,646
66,144
78,039
84,499
124,761
93,193
112,985
8,086
22,721
26,402
34,688
39,185
59,680
67,263
51,912
63,926
66,065
78,049
74,557
97 ,386
80,958
88,786
Source: Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in Argentina ,
Brazil, and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962),
since 1941. By 1956, it took about a month from the time a complaint
was heard in the courts before that complaint was settled. This has
put a strain on both managerial time and money.
After the revolution of 1964, all of the known communists and
many labor leaders had their political privileges taken away for ten
years by the army. This may have the opposite effect it should have.
With the government pro-business, the managers may again let all
grievances go to the labor courts to be settled when they should be
taking advantage of the weak organization of the unions to set-up
grievance procedures and collective bargaining procedures. These
procedures could be set up to the mutual benefit of both management
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and labor. Labor should want these because they probably couldn't get
a beneficial agreement through the labor courts. The objective for
management should be to start making the employees look to the business
as their benefactor instead of the state. This should make it much
easier for management to motivate the worker and perhaps discourage
them from using the minimum wage. Wages could then be used as a moti-
vating force. If the courts ever do become pro-labor again, management
would not have to rely on them.
The Union Leader
It was noted earlier that the Brazilian labor leader would rather
deal in politics than at the negotiating table. This characteristic seesed
to be true of all labor leaders in Latin America. Robert Alexander has
made a study of the Latin American labor leader and his characteristics.?
His findings ga/e some insight to the workings and philosophy of the
Brazilian labor leader. All the problems of dealing in generalities
must be taken into account when applying the findings to any one par-
ticular labor leader in any particular country.
The Latin American labor leader has operated in an atmosphere
of revolution where profound social, economical, and political trans-
formations have taken place. This revolution has been brought about
by the impact of European and North American industrialization on Latin
America. This impact has undermined the social conditions of these
countries and has helped to bring about the emergence of the middle
Robert Alexander, "The Latin American Labor Leader," Industrial
Relations and Social Change (Gainsville: University of Florida Press,
1965), pp. 70-86.
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class and intensified nationalism. Latin American labor leaders have
not only been interested in bread-and-butter questions, but also in the
whole process of achieving for their members full participation in the
economical, social, and political life of the countries. It has been
for this reason that labor parties have allied themselves with political
parties that support these kinds of changes.
Another reason for the close alliance between the labor unions
and political parties has been that organized labor was the first institu-
tion in Latin America which had the potential to challenge the armed
forces for government power. Through the power of the general strike,
the unions could unite and overthrow governments dominated by the
military, or help defend governments favored by the workers against
attempted coups by the armed forces. Thirdly, the very tradition
of political domination by labor parties has fed on itself. Latin
American unions have always been controlled by labor parties of one
kind or another. This tradition has been a hard one to break as the
armed forces in these countries must be well aware.
It was interesting to note that United States labor has tried
to change this political party thinking of the Latin American labor
leader. The quotation below summarizes the attempts and the results:
Since World War II, the labor movement in the United States has
spent much energy and considerable money in trying to convince Latin
American labor leaders of the danger of being too closely tied to
political parties. Although this "missionary" work has had its im-
pact, it has not yet fundamentally altered the situation. Nor is it
clear that the kind of nonpartisan labor movement characteristic of
the United States is appropriate for Latin America.
8
8
Ibid., p. 74.
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Usually the labor leader has been better educated than most of the
Latin American workers. This has been due partly because of the labor laws
of these countries which require that trade union officials be able to
read and write. In recent years, labor movements of Latin America have
set up schools to train labor leaders. "In Brazil this has been the
federations and confederations of Catholic Workers Circles. For a time
this was the only rival to the communists in the field of Brazil. "9
The Latin merican labor leader has been becoming, by necessity,
a professional. There have been several reasons for this. One is that
as the economies of these countries become increasingly complex there
will be more large firms; and the increase in the number of large firms
in each industry will multiply the job of representing the workers.
This means that additional time will have to be spent by the leaders
in handling grievances of workers. Also as the economy becomes more
complex, more time will have to be spent on economical rather than
political factors. Since the union's affairs demand more time of its
leaders, the union increasingly will be called upon to support them
financially. Mr. Alexander summarized his article with the following
conclusions:
First, the labor leader will remain a figure of major political
importance during the next few decades. So long as government
instability persists, he will need to be active in the political
arena, while politicians will seek his support and attempt to limit
the potency of his opposition.
Second, as the economies of the Latin American countries become
more complex, the trade-union leader will be forced to devote an in-
creasing amount of energy to negotiating collective agreements and
9
Ibid.
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serving his members. Of course, the degree to which he will be free
to do this will depend greatly upon the development of sufficient
political stability to permit him to divert his attention from
politics. Third, the trade-union leader will continue to seek basic
changes in Latin American society. He will seek economic develop-
ment to provide more jobs for his members. He will seek to break
the remnants of aristocratic control of government and to increase
the participation of union members in civil affairs. 10
These finds should be directly applicable to Brazil, It is of
the very upmost importance that the political leaders of Brazil be able
to maintain political stability. This is so that the labor leader will
be assured of his union's place in society. Only then will he be able
to devote his time to running the economic and social affairs of his
members. The businessman must recognize the social revolution that
has been taking place in his country, and must try to control the
events that are taking place so that there will be only social and not
military revolutions.
Government Control
The control of the syndicates by the government has been very
tight. The law has prescribed the administrative pattern for the unions
at all levels. This has included terms of office, qualifications and
responsibilities of officers, and the procedure for holding union elec-
tions.
Elections could not be held without the approval of the ministry,
which had the authority to pass on the qualifications of all candi-
dates and could veto any candidate or any elected official who was
deemed "subversive."H
10ibid.
U
Ibld
. , p. 60.
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The Minister of Labor has had the power of withholding the recognition
of the syndicates, and the President has had the power over charters
for confederations. The following quotation shows how it would be
virtually impossible to operate without this recognition:
Insofar as the workers' unions are concerned, it was virtually
impossible for them to function unless they had government recogni-
tion, since they could not use the labor courts and other arrange-
ments for handling labor problems. •• They could not bargain with
employers and were unlikely to have any funds. 12
Some more of the powers of the Minister of Labor are explained
below:
The law permits the Minister of Labor to "intervene" if dis-
agreements or other circumstances hamper the syndicate in the
performance of its functions. The Ministry may also appoint a
deputy to administer the union, and to supervise elections of
new officers in case of violations of the regulations pertaining
to trade unions. There may also be punishment by fines, sus-
pension of the syndicate, or revocation of the union charter.
Further, the Ministry of Labor may appoint the chairman of union
election meetings, draft model trade union constitutions and by-
laws, and interpret a union's constitution and by-laws. 13
The 1946 Constitution gave the unions the right to strike, but
strikes were to be regulated by the government. As of 1962, no legis-
lation had been enacted which contained such regulation. Nevertheless,
the government has wide powers in the matter of determining the legality
or illegality of a strike. Until 1953, there were relatively few major
strikes, but since then strikes have become more numerous. Most of the
strikes have been over wage demands caused by worker discontent with
the rapid increase in the cost of living. "Most of the strikes have
been relatively short, and in all of them workers have gained at least
12Ibid
. , p. 60.
13U. S. Department of Labor, pj>. cit
. , p. 25,
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part of what they had demanded."^ Another cause of strikes has been
the failure on the part of management to meet payrolls or to abide
by the decisions of the labor courts.
Through the syndicate tax, the government has been able to
control the financial aspects of the union. Thus there hasn't been any
aspect of union activity not controlled by the government. This, in
turn, has made it imperative that the unions be able to control govern-
ment activity. This has not been an economic issue, but a political
one, which brings us to the part of the paper dealing with communism-
-
the dominate political philosophy in union activities. It already
has been seen why most union activity has been done in the political
area; now it will be shown why most unions have chosen the Communist
Party to carry on that activity.
I4Ibid
. , p. 26.
THE COMMUNISTS
The Communist Party in Brazil has worked in two different areas:
(1) through the poor farmers in the North, and (2) through the government
sponsored labor unions, most of whicu are in the South. This paper hasn't
been concerned with the northern farmers, but it uas tried to show that
through the lack of good management, the poverty of the worker, the use
of the father-state image, the ambition of the worker, and the weak
organisation of the unions, the door has been opened for the communists
to extend their influence over the laborer through the labor unions.
With the strict government control on the power of the unions,
the power of the party in control of a union has been severely limited.
The Minister of Labor has pulled all of the strings, both through his
control over recognition of unions, election of officers, and through
his control over finances.
The communists could have tried to remove themselves somewhat
from the Minister's power by setting up their own labor organizations
outside of the government recognized ones. There have been several
reasons for not doing so. In the first place, there would be the great
difficulty which they knew would face any independent trade-union move-
ment. They would be unable to use the labor courts and thus would be at
a real disadvantage when dealing with firms on grievance procedures and in
collective bargaining. This has been especially true since management
usually has let collective bargaining and grievance procedures go to the
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labor courts by never meeting with the union representatives. Secondly,
there would be the syndicate tax at the disposal of the communists if
they could capture a government sponsored trade-union. On the other
hand, if the union was independent the union members still would have
to pay the "imposto sindical" without getting any of the funds. For
these reasons the communists mostly have tried to stay in the government
sponsored labor movement. They have been quite successful in this
area, and the following section explains some of the reasons for this
success.
Even though the control of the government over the unions has
been strong, the communist influence in the trade-union movement has
been great. Some of the more important reasons for this are mentioned
in the quotation below:
In the first place, the Communists have been the only political
element in the country which has worked in an organized way in the
trade unions to form groups of party members in each union, to use
the influence of this small but organized minority in determining
the results of elections and in influencing the policies of the
unions.
Because of well-organized caucuses within many unions, the
Communists were able to force many non-Communist labor leaders to
work with them out of fear of being ousted in the next election.
These trade unionists, consciously or unconsciously became tools
of the Communists.
The result of the training of Communist trade unionists has been
that unions under Communist leadership are frequently the most ef-
ficient and most honest labor organizations.. .Also, the Communists
are frequently very effective in their dealings with the employers,
preferring to deal directly with them. ..The Communists have been
aided in their work in the trade unions by the general disesteem
of the higher ranking leadership in the unions, a leadership in-
herited from the Vargas period. In fact, one of the Communists'
chief elements of strength in the labor movement has been their
unceasing attack on the pelegos, those high-echelon trade unionists
who owe their positions more to the support of the Ministry of Labor
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than to the rank and file or even the secondary leadership of the
trade unions. ..Another source of Communist labor strength has
been the Communist press and propaganda. For the most part,
the non-Communist newspapers in Rio and other cities have paid
little attention to the life of the labor movement.!
The communists have risen to power in the trade-union movement
mainly because there has been little effective opposition. Their
activities have been aided by employers who label any militant trade-
unionist who has tried to fight for his members a communist. If he
wasn't already a communist, the employers forced him to become one.
The power of the Communist Party has fluctuated widely depending
upon the feelings of the government. Whenever the Communist Party has
gotten too strong, the army has stepped in, overthrown the government,
and put the party leaders in jail. This has been, of course, a very
fine short -run solution, but it has done little toward bringing about
understanding between management, the government, and the politically
inclined labor unions. Nor did it change the factors which made the
trade-unions turn to the communists in the first place. The government
has found it much easier to treat the effects- -not the cause of labor
unrest.
The ideal solution would be to develop a group of capable non-
communist labor leaders to off-set those of the Communist Party. The
Catholic Church has done some work in this area, but this takes time.
The best answer from the standpoint of a foreign investor would be
for the government to outlaw the Communist Party and maintain strict
control over the activities of the unions. The problem here would be
Robert J. Alexander, Labor Relations in /rgentina, Brazil
,
and Chile (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 73-76.
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for the government to do so and at the same time keep some pretense
of democracy. Totalitarianism seems a high price to pay for foreign
capital. In the long-run, the only solution which would seem best
for both foreign investors and society as a whole is for the worker
to be convinced that capitalism is the best system. The government and
management must work together to prove to the unionists that the capi-
talistic system used by the Brazilian government can do more for the
unions, over the long-run, than any other economic system. Even more
important, both management and the government must make the system
work.
SUMMARY
This paper has dealt with the labor-management problems involved
in making a decision as whether or not to invest foreign savings in Brazil,
It was assumed that the most important factors determining investment were
inflation, communism, and nationalism in the form of anti-Yankee feeling
and legislation. The objective of the paper was to show the role that
labor-management problems have played in influencing each factor and
in trying to draw some conclusion as to what might be done to lessen
the detrimental effects that labor-management problems have on these
factors. As inflation, communism, and anti-American feeling are not
entirely separable items, but each being a cause and a result of the
other, most of the paper dealt with examining the various parts of the
labor-management sector of Brazil. The only exception to this was the
first part of the paper which showed the role that labor had played in
providing growth for the economic development of Brazil through the
inflationary process.
The paper started out by showing, with the aid of the appendix,
that inflation in Brazil had not been a hindrance to the economic growth
of Brazil during the 1950* s. This was a result of the wage earning sec-
tor not being able to increase wages as rapidly as general price levels.
These funds were then available to private businesses and the government
for investment purposes. In this way, funds moved from the consumption
sector to the investment sector by the inflationary process. It was
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also shown that this investment took place without a significant mis-
appropriation of resources. Businesses didn't invest in capital which
had short gestation periods.
Economic growth through forced savings was stopped when increased
pressure from the labor sector for higher wages made labor costs move
more closely with general price levels. This resulted in a flight of
capital out of the country and a halting of the inflow of foreign capi-
tal. Several authors have commented that the only way for Brazil to
continue its growth rate is by domestic saving assisted by foreign in-
vestment. Growth through the inflationary process is finished.
The paper then explained the differences between the Brazilian
manager and the manager from the United States. The Brazilian has not
been the professional that his counterpart in the United States has been.
As most private businesses in Brazil have been closed corporations, the
owners have picked relatives to manage the businesses. A manager has
gotten his job because of his blood- line- -not his ability. The chance
that the Brazilian will become a professional in the near future is
rather slim. There are few schools of business administration in Brazil
and few qualified college students want to become managers. Any kind
of manual labor in Brazil has a low social status; so most students go
into college teaching, governmental administration, research, or the
army.
Most managers have received all of their training on the job,
and then worked their way up only to be passed over by relatives of the
owner if they were not relatives themselves. Because of the lack of
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adequate training, the next generation of managers will be little dif-
ferent than the present. If the foreign investor wants to put his
money in Brazil, he will probably have to continue to send his own
managers so as to insure the safety of his investment.
It was shown that the worker in Brazil has been to a great
extent illiterate and untrained. This lack of skilled workers has
presented a real cost of doing business in Brazil. Like the managers,
most workers have had to be trained on the job. In many cases, the
worker must be given some education before he can be trained. The
government has set up a training program through private businesses
called SENAI. This has been a very good program, but has not been able
to turn out the number of skilled workers demanded by industry. Because
of the great demand, the laborers have been induced to move from job to
job as opportunities develop.
Host workers in Brazil have been good employees, both hard
working and ambitious. They usually have wanted to better themselves
by acquiring some skill. The skilled workers, having been associated
with the middle class in Brazil, have had a higher social status than
the common laborer.
Most skilled laborers in the United States belong to some kind
of a trade union. Probably less than 15% of the laborers in Brazil
are now active in the trade union movement. The government has made
sure that the laborer looks to the state for solutions to his desires
rather than the union. The government has enacted a great number of
laws which benefit the workers and have had the result of tying the
worker to the state. The government has enacted a minimum wage law
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that moves with some degree of accuracy with the cost of living. This
was needed because most wages have been placed at the minimum wage rate.
The workers have been paid a bonus each year equal to one-
twelfth of the monthly salary for each month worked. The Constitution
has guaranteed the workei time and a fifth for all overtime. Work on
holidays has not been permitted without the permission of the Ministry
of Labor. The Constitution also has guaranteed the worker twenty days
of vacation a year after a years employment. After ten years service,
the worker would acquire tenure and could not be dismissed. To fire a
worker who has not worked ten years, the employer has had to pay him
one month* s wage for each year worked. To keep workers from obtfining
tenure, they have been fired after as much as 7 to 8 year's service.
This increased turnover has kept the skilled labor force from fully
developing.
The government has enacted a very large social security program
which entitles the worker to old age benefits, disability payments,
maternity benefits, burial benefits, workman's compensation, and some
housing benefits. The social security system has been quite inefficient
and costly. As much as fifty percent of the cost of a worker has been
tied up in social security benefits, SENAI payments, and other costs.
The result of these laws has been that the worker has looked to the
state as the institution that could best fulfill his needs rather than a
union.
Collective bargaining and grievance procedures have been handled
through a system of government labor courts. Each firm has joined a
syndicate with other firms. The syndicate has bargained with a worker
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syndicate. How well each group has done has depended upon the attitude
of the government. For this reason, the labor leader has had to be
politically inclined so as to insure the bargaining position of his
members.
The labor leader also has been involved in politics because
he has been a part of a social revolution which has taken place all
over Latin America. The labor leader has tried to win social gains
for his workers as well as economic ones. It has been and will con-
tinue to be the job of the government and management to insure that
these revolutions remain social and not military.
The Communist Party has been the most influential political
party in the trade union movement. They have been able to set up
organized caucuses in many unions and use these minorities to force
labor leaders to work with them. As the communists usually have been
the best trained leaders in the labor movement, the unions under the
influence of the communists have frequently been the most efficient.
The controls that the government have had over labor unions,
i.e., recognition of officer candidates, recognition of the union it-
self, control of finances, etc., has limited the influence of the com-
munists in the labor movement. The communists wouldn't start their
own unions because they would have the use of the syndicate tax if
they could control a government sponsored union.
The army has periodically staged revolutions in Brazil and
has put the communist leader in jail or exile. But this isn't a
lasting solution to the problem. The government and business must
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work together to prove to the workers that the capitalistic system
used in Brazil can do more in the long-run for the workers, than any
other system.
In order to get foreign investment, the government must be able
to slow down the inflation rate. This can only be accomplished if the
government maintains tight control over the wages paid in the labor
market. The government must also be able to free the unions from the
influence of the communists in the labor market. The Minister of
Labor already has this power. But even more important, the government
and business must let a strong group of non-communist leaders develop
in order to keep the communists out of the labor movement. One of
the ways to do this would be for each company to set up its own grievance
procedures. This would give labor leaders experience in dealing with
businesses on an economic basis rather than on a political basis. This
would have the added effect of making the worker begin to look to the
business rather than the government for the satisfaction of his wants.
The government also will have to prove to the people that foreign
businesses and nationalism are not necessarily incompatible with each
other. Foreign investment is needed for Brazil to develop as a modern
nation.
One factor that hasn't been mentioned before is that the government
is going to have to maintain some degree of stability if it is going to
lure foreign investment into Brazil. If inflation can be controlled the
labor movement no longer will have to use communism to get its demands.
If the degree of nationalism in the country can be controlled, then
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there should be political stability in Brazil. Political instability
is a result of these other factors—not a cause.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Werner Baer and Isaac Kerstenetzky have shown in Mr. Baer's
book, Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil , how in-
flation in Brazil brought about forced savings in the private sector
of the economy through a reallocation of national income. The real-
location came about because the increases in wages in the labor sector
of the economy didn't keep up with the increases in the cost of living.
Mr. Baer also showed that during the fifties this reallocation through
forced savings helped the country to continue its rapid rate of growth.
This was done without any significant missal location of resources.
Table 4 shows how capital formation had traditionally been ac-
complished through the private sector, and also how the influence of
the public sector increased in the late 1950 's until it was 38.2 percent
of the total. Table 5 contains a proportional distribution of sources
of funds on an aggregative level. By comparing Table 4 with Table 5
it can be seen that savings in the private sector have been much greater
than savings in the public sector. Also, throughout most of the period,
the government's share in the investment sector has been larger than its
share of total savings. This means that in one way or another non-
governmental savings were an important element in financing the govern-
ment's fixed capital formation.
The importance of foreign savings had fluctuated over the postwar
period; only exceeding the 15 percent mark once. Nevertheless, it cannot
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TABLE 5
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR'S SHARE OF FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
Mixed Government
Year Public Sector Enterprises Private Sector* Total
1947 15.81 — — 84. 2X 100.OX
1948 23.3 -- 76.7 100.0
1949 29.4 -- 70.6 100.0
1950 35.1 -- 64.9 100.0
1951 25.0 — 75.0 100.0
1952 26.8 — 73.2 100.0
1953 29.4 — 70.6 100.0
1954 24.3 — 75.7 100.0
1955 24.0 — 76.0 100.0
1956 24.8 3. IX 72.1 100.0
1957 37.0 4.7 58.3 100.0
1958 40.8 5.5 53.7 100.0
1959 32.3 6.0 61.7 100.0
1960 38.2 8.0 53.6 100.0
Until 1956 the private sector includes nixed government enter-
prises.
Source: Fundacao Getulio Vargas, estimated from data in
Revista Brasileira de Economia , Marco 1962.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
be written off as being unimportant, since the areas it went into were
of strategic importance in the Brazilian growth process—both in the
financing of government -sponsored infrastructuredinvestment and in pri-
vate investment. It should be also noted that in the 1950's there was a
close correlation between the level of foreign finance and the rate of
growth in fixed capital.
Table 6 shows more clearly how the Brazilian government has been
relatively bigger invester than a saver. It was Bayer and Kerstenetzky's
contention that much of the redistribution of resources from the private
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TABLE 6
SAVINGS AND CAPITAL FORMATION OF THE PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT
SECTORS AS A PROPORTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME
Balance of
Private Sector Public Sector Payments Deficit
Capital Capital on Current
Year Savings Formation Savings Formation Account
1947 12 14 4 3 2
1948 14 14 4 4
1949 10 10 4 5 1
1950 12 8 2 5 -1
1951 13 17 5 5 3
1952 16 17 4 6 4
1953 15 11 1 4
1954 19 19 4 5 1
1955 17 14 2 5
1956 17 13 1 4
1957 16 12 1 7 2
1958 12 10 5 9 2
1959 16 14 6 10 2
1960 14 12 5 10 3
Source: Computed from national accounts figures of the Fundacao
Getulio Vargas by L. Kerstenetsky.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
sector to the public sector was accomplished by the inflationary process.
The few times that the private savings proportion was smaller than the
public savings proportion there were substantial inflows of foreign
savings to make up the deficit.
In Table 7 you can see that about 55-60 percent of the savings
from the private sector came in the form of retained earnings. The balance
represents savings by the public through increased holdings of money of
time deposits in commercial or federal savings banks or reserves of
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TABLE 7
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF NET PRIVATE SAVINGS
Retained
Changes of
Money Supply
in Hands of
Year Earnings Public Other* Total
1947 54 3 43 100
1948 45 18 37 100
1949 33 18 49 100
1950 29 48 23 100
1951 40 22 38 100
1952 47 15 38 100
1953 46 21 33 100
1954 49 24 27 100
1955 60 19 21 100
1956 58 21 21 100
1957 46 20 34 100
1958 59 20 21 100
1959 53 23 24 100
1960 55 8 37 100
Consists principally of reserves of insurance and capitalization
companies and time deposits in commercial banks and savings banks of the
federal government.
Source: Revista Brasileira de Economta , Marco 1962, and
SUMOC, Relaterio do Exercisio de 1961 .
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
capitalization and insurance companies. This balance was appropriated
by the government and private sectors, partially through loans and
partially through the inflationary process. The holders of liquid
assets wanted to protect their savings by putting the money into
assets whose value moved more closely with the movement of price levels.
Table 8 provides even more conclusive evidence of the reliance of the
private businesses on internal funds for financing investment activities.
TABLE 8
ORIGIN AND USE OF FUNDS OF CORPORATIONS
(IN PERCENTAGE OF ORIGIN AND USE)
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1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
ALL CORPORATIONS
Origin 100 100
External .... 77 7JL
Capital 15 22
Total current liabilities
of banks •• 7 8
Total current liabilities
of others 55 41
Internal 23 29
Reappraisals
Reserves 4 5
New reserves 14 16
Depreciation .•••• 5 6
Use 100 100
Fixed assets 22 30
Liquid assets -- 7
Current assets , inv 26 20
Current assets, others 52 43
COMMERCE
Origin 100 100
External 83 28
Capital 35 27
Total current liabilities
of banks • 7 1
Total current liabilities
of others • 41
Internal 17 7_2
Reappraisals
Reserves 13 23
Depreciat ion 4 49
Use 100 100
Fixed assets 14 22
Liquid assets.... -17 6
Current assets, inv. 54 30
Current assets, others.. ... 48 42
100
22
30
18
14
9
2
100
34
3
10
53
100
-21
58
38
2
100
21
14
56
21
3
3
10
5
100
27
12
11
50
100
100
35
22
43
100
68
16
43
12
2
24
6
100
30
3
13
54
100
68
11
50
32
100
13
27
56
-3
3
100
16
10
14
60
30
2
100
17
3
21
59
100
67
20
10
37
33
3
6
17
7
100
35
7
16
42
100
21
13
10
53
23
2
19
2
100
12
5
16
66
100
66
18
39
34
4
6
17
7
100
36
4
14
46
100
21
16
11
48
25
22
3
100
10
5
14
69
100
71
13
10
48
2_2
3
3
18
5
100
30
3
18
49
100
74
16
14
44
26
1
23
2
100
13
3
33
51
TABLE 3 (continued)
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1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
INDUSTRY
Origin 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
External 69 44 100 76 70 63 64 66
Capital 28 36 65 30 20 22 20 13
Total current liabilities
of banks 9 8 10 11 9 11 8 10
Total current liabilities
of others 32 — 26 35 41 30 36 43
Internal 3256^2430363634
Reappraisals. • — — 4 3
Reserves 23 20 -6 17 23 25 27 24
Depreciation 9 36 577776
Use 100 100 100 KK) 100 100 100 100
Fixed assets 32 41 38 36 31 36 36 29
Liquid assets. •••• -45264744
Current assets, lnv 39 21 15 20 14 19 17 21
Current assets, others 33 33 44 39 51 38 43 46
Source: Every year the Conjuntura Economics publishes the balance
sheets of corporations -in 1961 for 6,441 corporations in the fields of
commerce, industry, transportation and public services, and other miscel-
laneous activities. The ratios in this table were computed from these
balance sheets.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
The proportion of fixed assets on the use side of funds, representing
gross fixed investment activities of firms, generally has been matched
on the origin side of funds by the internal funds proportion. This is a
good indication that firms relied primarily on their internal resources
for investment funds.
Table 9 shows how Brazil's high rate of real growth was accompanied
by high rates of inflation. It is interesting to note that the high rate
of real growth in the latter part of the fifties, when the rate of inflation
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Year
TABLE 9
REAL GROWTH RATE AND CHANGES IN PRICE LEVELS
(PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATES)
Real Rate Cost of Living Changes:*
of Growth Rio de Janeiro Sao Paulo
Wholesale Price
Changes*
1947 1.8 6 24
1948 9.5 4 3
1949 5.6 6 4
1950 5.0 11 4
1951 5.1 11 11
1952 5.6 21 24
1953 3.2 17 16
1954 7.7 26 23
1955 6.8 19 17
1956 1.9 22 33
1957 6.9 13 14
1958 6.6 17 23
1959 7.3 52 43
1960 6.3 24 32
1961 7.7 43 43
-1
12
17
14
12
10
25
24
9
26
3
28
36
33
50
Annual change, December each year.
Source: Cqnjuntura Economics , Janeiro 1963, and Revista
Brasileira de Economia , Marco 1962.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development:
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
was increasing was on the average, higher than previously. This shows
that inflation didn't have a negative effect on the country's development.
It even can be partially shown that it had a positive effect. Table 4
showed that inflation must have had an effect on capital formation,
since the only explanation for the transfer of savings from the private
sector, which usually saved more than it invested, to the government
sector, which usually saved less than it invested, lies in the in-
flationary process.
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It is also Baer and Kerstenetzky's contention that inflation
not only acted as an intersectoral mechanism for transferring savings,
but that it also acted as a mechanism for transferring resources from
the consuming to the investing sector, be it governmental or private.
Table 10 shows the possibility of a proportional decline in wages and
salary to gross domestic income when the factor of indirect taxes are
taken into account. Indirect taxes increased at a faster rate in
relation to gross income at factor cost than did labor income. The
Brazilian tax system is quite regressive in nature. Because of this,
the burden of payment is put on the lower classes more than the upper.
The conclusion is that this indicates the possibility of a proportional
decline of the laborers' share of National Income. Table 11 points this
out even clearer. The ratio of wages paid to worker value added for the
entire manufacturing sector and some select industries were taken for
several years. The decline in the ratio is significant in all cases
end is even more noticeable in the second half of the 1950* s at the
time when the rate of inflation was higher than it was in the earlier
part of that decade.
Table 12 shows how the median salary in manufacturing industries
lagged behind the cost of living increases. This is not to say that the
workers suffered in their standard of living, but that the increase of
the living standard was slower than the increase in the real national
product. The declining share of the wage earning sector contributed to
the large retained earnings which were used by the private sector in its
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TABLE 10
RENUMERATION OF LABOR AND INDIRECT TAXES AS A PROPORTION
OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST
Remuneration of Labor over Indirect Taxes over Gross
Year Gross Income at Factor Cost Income at Factor Cost
1947 39 11
1948 40 11
1949 41 12
1950 41 12
1951 39 13
1952 40 13
1953 40 12
1954 39 15
1955 42 13
1956 45 14
1957 45 14
1958 45 17
1959 45 19
1960 44 18
Source: Calculations made by I. Kerstenetsky from data of the
Fundacao Getulio Vargas.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Deve lopment
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
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TABLE 11
RATIO OF WAGES PAID TO WORKERS TO VALUE ADDED
All Manufacturing
Industries Textiles Food Products
1949 23 1949 30 1949 14
1955 24 1955 32 1955 18
1956 24 1956 32 1956 16
1957 23 1957 35 1957 16
1958 21 1958 32 1958 15
1959 19 1959 29 1959 14
Basic Metals Industries
and Metal Products Machinery
1949 27 1949 32
1955 27 1955 32
1956 25 1956 .30
1957 25 1957 31
1958 23 1958 28
1959 21 1959 23.5
Source: Computed from IBGE, Censo Industrial , 1950 and 1960,
and IBGE, Producao Industrial do Brasil , 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrial!gat ion and Economic Development
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965).
79
TABLE 12
WAGE BEHAVIOR IN BRAZIL
A. Changes In Minimum Wages
Date of Effectiveness Minimum Wage (CR$s) (Per Month)
1940 (July) 240
1943 (December) 380
1952 (January) 1,200
1954 (July) 2,400
1956 (August) 3,800
1959 (January) 6,000
1960 (October) 9,600
1961 (October) 13,440
Source: Anuario Estatistico .
B. Median Salary in Manufacturing Industry (Selected Years)
Percentage Increase of Wages in
Total Manufacturing Industries
Basic metal industries
Machinery.
Textiles
Food products.
Cost of Living Increases
Rio de Janeiro.
Sao Paulo
Changes in Real Output Total
Manufacturing Industries
Basic metal industries
Machinery.
Textiles
Food products
1949-55 1955-56
34
30
1956-57
22
16
1957-58
192
183
12
21
163 27 15 21
175 33 19 17
221 48 25 14
148 21 16 15
143 23 19 15
66
81
6
16
6
-8 20
-- 15 -4 8
41 -12 34
46 -12 22 10
Source: IBGE, Producao Industrial Brasileira , 1955-1958,
Conjuntura Economica , Revista Brasileira de Economia , Marco 1962.
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TABLE 12 (continued)
C. Short-Period Changes in Median Salaries
of Workers in Manufacturing
Basic Cost of
Metals Food Living
Time Period Industries Machinery Textiles Products Total (Gb)
April 1955-
9 8 11 7 13 14
April 1956-
Novewber 1956., 32 27 43 51 38 14
November 1956-
4 2 1 •>• — 1 7
April 1957-
November 1957., 11 12 2 3 5 3
November 1957-
5 5 8 3 6 23
April 1958-
November 1958., 11 9 8 6 8 10
November 1953-
19 22 32 39 30 20
April 1959-
November 1959., 15 14
Anuario Estatistico. t
8 2 10 26
Source
;
D. Percent:age Increase in Salaries of Federal Civil Service
and Cost of Living in Guanabara
Classes of L945 ;L948- 1952- 1955 L956- 1959- July 1960-
Civil Servants 48 52 55 56 59 July 1960 Dec. 1960
A 41 67 40 29 30 28 60
B 38 64 39 61 30 -- 54
C 37 60 37 65 30 mm 60
D 37 57 36 77 30 -- 62
E 38 52 34 85 30 ~ ma 65
F 36 53 34 80 30 — • 66
G 31 46 31 80 30 ••
H 32 39 28 81 30 55
I 33 33 25 82 30 -- --
J 34 28 22 78 30 m *• 46
K 31 23 28 69 30 mm 53
L 32 19 24 70 30 — ^ 51
M 35 15 14 81 30 -• «• 50
N 38 11 12 72 30 -- 50
40 7 11 70 30 13 44
Cost of Living 28 51 72 21 85 28 15
81
TABLE 12 (continued)
Note: Since 1959 a new civil service classification has existed,
The proportionate increases listed since 1959 are roughly comparable to
the old ones.
Source: Fundacao Getulio Vargas,
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
in Brazil (Horaewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
investment program. While the higher investment proportion of the govern-
ment, in comparison to its savings proportion, suggests that through the
inflationary process the government managed to transfer savings from the
private to the public sector.
One of the usual consequences of inflation is that it misdirects the
capital into inefficient resources. These resources usually are found
in excessive inventories. Table 13 shows a breakdown of investment into
fixed capital formation and inventory investment. This is used because
there isn't, at the present time, any breakdowns of yearly sectoral
investment. The early postwar years were characterized by inventory
decumulations while the nineteen fifties were dominated by inventory
accumulations; although the rate does not seem to have a close con-
nection with changes in the rate of inflation. Most of the government
accumulation was for coffee. Another indication that Inventory ac-
cumulation wasn't excessive is seen in Table 8. On the use side of the
corporate funds there is a relatively small proportion of the funds used
for inventory, and there doesn't seen to be any discernible trend in
inventory accumulation.
Besides the investment inefficiencies which are usually present
when secular inflation exists, one might expect the other investments in
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TABLE 13
BRAZILIAN INVENTORY ACCUMULATION
Invantory as
a % of Total
Capital For-
mation
Distribute Inventory Accumulation
Private
Government TotalYear AgriculLture Urban Total
1947 -11*
1948 - 2*
1949 -14*
1950 -16*
1951 15 24% 761 -- (")** 100%
1952 24 27 42 31 (31) 100
1953 5 167 -30 37 (-37) 100
1954 20 36 54 10 (15)*** 100
1955 12 70 6 24 (44)*** 100
1956 12 83 2 15 (7.5) 100
1957 19 42 18 40 (30) 100
1958 12 36 -36 100 (97) 100
1959 19 16 3 81 (71) 100
1960 16 18 2 80 (71) 100
^Trom 1947 to 1950 the decumulation of inventory was almost
entirely concentrated in the private sector.
In parentheses, percentage of government total composed of
coffee inventories.
***
These numbers are higher than the proportion attributed to the
government sector because decumulation took place in the noncoffee
government sector.
Source: Computed from data furnished by the Fundacao Getulio
Vargas, unpublished.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
in Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
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projects to have a short gestation period. Less investment night be
expected in heavy industry and public utilities and store investment
in such items as housing. Table 14 doesn't indicate that there wasn't
a hedge against inflation in Brazil by investing in capital with short
gestation periods as not all industry is represented in the table.
But there doesn't appear to exist any obvious lopsidedness in the in-
vestment structure of the industries that are represented in the table.
TABLE 14
PRODUCTION INDEXES
(1948 100)
Residential
Year Cement Steel Construction*
1947 82 79 91
1949 115 119 110
1950 125 153 123
1951 130 167 161
1952 145 174 179
1953 183 199 199
1954 217 230 191
1955 234 231 93
1956 294 268 163
1957 287 248 182
1958 337 273 124
1959 341 301 109
1960 397 356 133
1961 421 390 114
This represents only construction permits. It thus might some-
what overestimate actual construction.
Source: Conjuntura Economica , Janeiro 1963.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
in Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
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If one will accept the fact that the capital/ output ratio can
be used as an indicator of the efficiency of the investment: structure,
then Table 15 would indicate that efficiency increased, not decreased,
with inflation in the nineteen fifties. The decline of the ratio in
the periods with higher inflation rates would not indicate a less ef-
ficient investment structure, since this decline could be taken to mean
an increase in the productivity of investment.
TABLE 15
CHANGES IN THE CAPITAL/OUTPUT RATIO
1947-52 1953-56 1957-60 1947-60
Gross fixed investment/GDP in
current prices.... 15.1 14.4 14.7 14.7
Gross fixed investment/GDP in
constant prices 13.1 13.4 14.1 13.4
Real rate of growth, yearly
average 6.1 5.4 6.7 6.0
Capital /Output ratio-- 2.52 2.67 2.19 2.45
current prices: 1/3 (103)* (109)* (89)* (100)*
Capital/Output ratio-- 2.15 2.48 2.10 2.23
constant prices: 2/3 (96)* (111)* (94)* (100)*
Ratio of the capital/output ratio for the period to the capital/
output ratio for 1947-60 as a whole.
Source: Computed from data in Revista Brasileira de Economia
,
Marco, 1962.
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
in Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D* Irwin, Inc., 1965).
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Baer and Kerstenetzky explained the reason for so few distortions
in the investment structure of the Brazilian economy as follows:
•••one might also claim that inflation in a country like Brazil
is very old, and the business sector has long ago learned how to
adjust to price changes. Since it was easy to adjust to price
changes and since over long periods of time prices kept ahead
of certain costs, especially labor costs, investors found that
inflation had little negative effect on their plans. Since ex-
ternal finance is small, i.e., finance through financial insti-
tutions, the problems of cash balances and the controlled rate
of interest were not pressing ones. Finally, since in an economy
with a history of inflation, money has never been looked upon as
a store of value, and since the development possibilities of the
country with its extensive markets are real and are just coming
into being, the real long-term return on fixed capital investment
seems to have been stronger than the short-term hedge against
price increases.^
Although the findings in this study weren't conclusive, the
implications in the area of economic growth of underdeveloped countries
are so important that they can't be ignored.
Verner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 135.
TABLE 16
BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT REVENUE STRUCTURE
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A. Revenue According to Levels of Government
1949 1957 1960
Federal 501 451 481
States 32 37 38
Federal District 7 6 5
Municipalities 11 12 9
Total 1001 1001 1001
B. Revenue of Federal Government by Types of Taxes
1949 1957 1960
Excise 381 411 431
Income tax , 33 35 32
Import tax 17 12 11
Stamp tax and similar..... 12 12 14
Total 1001 1001 1001
C. Further Breakdown of Brazilian Tax Structure
by All Government Levels
1949 I960
Munic- Munic-
Federal State ipal Federa l State ipal
Sales 68.91 76.11
Excise 26.91 24.21
Income 23.1 18.6
Fuel and lubricants. 5.8 6.0
Stamp duties.... 7.7 7.4
Import duties.... 8.2 6.4
Tax on houses..... 25.81 32.31
Tax on professions.. •• 32.3 28.9
Transmission inter vivos .. 8.7 4.0
Land property (rural & urban).. 2.9 6.4 1.1 6.8
Business license... 12.9 7.6
Power consumption. -- .5
Transmission causa mortis 1.9 1.0
Net premiums in imports (agios) 15.2
Social security contributions.. 17.3 16.7
Others 11.0 17.6 22.6 5.0 17.8 24.4
Total 100.01 100.01100.01 100.01 100.01100.01
Source: Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development
in Brazil (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965).
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This paper was written to show the labor -management problems
involved in making decisions relating to the investment of foreign
savings in Brazil. It was assumed that the three most important factors
determining investment in Brazil were inflation, communism, and
nationalism in the form of anti-Yankee feeling and legislation.
Findings of this study indicate that inflation in Brazil during
the 1950 's was not a hindrance to the economic growth of the country.
The reason for this being that the wage earning sector of the economy
was not able to increase wages as rapidly as the increase in price
levels. The difference between wage increases and general price level
increases could be invested in capital instead of being spent in the
consumer market. The findings also show that inflation didn't cause a
misappropriation of resources during the 1950* s.
Growth through the inflationary process was halted as a result
of wage earners being able to force wages up at a rate more in line
with cost of living increases. The result has been a flight of capital
out of the country and a halting of foreign investment into the country.
Because of this, growth through the inflationary process is no longer
feasible.
The findings show how the manager in Brazil has not been the
professional that his counterpart in the United States has been.
Managers have received their jobs because they were relatives of the
owners, not because of their ability. There have been few college
students in Brazil that have wanted to become managers, and fewer
schools set up to train them. Consequently, most managers have had
to be trained on the job.
2The worker, like the manager, has been unfit for work in an
industrialized society. Training for the worker has been accomplished
on the job with some help from the government controlled SENAI program.
However, the SENAI program has been unable to meet the demand for
skilled workers.
The government has enacted many laws which have been designed
to draw the worker to the State rather than the union. Some of these
laws have included minimum wage legislation, "a thirteenth month bonus,"
vacation rights, seniority rights, over-time guarantees, and Social
Security legislation. The Social Security legislation has provided
old age benefits, disability, maternity, burial, housing benefits,
and workmen's compensation. These benefits have been very expensive,
amounting to as much as fifty percent of the total labor bill.
Collective bargaining and grievance procedures have been handled
through a system of labor courts. The decisions reached by the courts
depend largely upon the attitude of the government toward business and
labor. The government has controlled every aspect of the labor move-
ment including election of officers, recognition of unions, and union
finances. The labor leaders have had to be politically inclined so as to
protect the interests of their members. The labor leader also has
been interested in politics because of the social revolution which has
been taking place in Latin America. The labor leader wants to insure
social gains for his members as well as economic gains.
The Communist Party has been the dominant political party in
the labor movement because they have had little opposition from other
parties, and also because the communist controlled unions have frequently
3had the best leadership and been the most efficiently run. The in-
fluence of the Communist Pcirty has been lessened by the strong govern-
mental control over the labor movement.
In order for the government to lure foreign investment back
to Brazil, it must be able to slow down the rate of inflation. To be
able to do this the government must have strict control over labor
prices. The government also will have to insure that the labor unions
are relatively free of communist control, and government and business
will have to let efficient non-communist labor leaders develop so as
to offset the communist leaders.
Finally the government must persuade both business and labor
that foreign business and national interests are not incompatible; but
that the latter depends a great deal on the former.

